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Georgia's Public Duty Doctrine:
The Supreme Court Held Hostage
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
A study published in 1994 sought to determine the single most
litigated topic in Georgia local government law over the past thirty
years.' What legal issue of local government administration had most
often confronted Georgia's appellate courts over that recent but
considerable span of time?2 The revealed answer to that inquiry
commanded serious consideration-not because of its unexpectedness but
rather its unequivocal conclusiveness:
Local government liability for the alleged misconduct of officers and
employees dwarfs all other subtopics. For the past thirty years,
liability has extracted more time and attention from Georgia's appellate
courts than any other subject of local government law. "Liability" will
assuredly constitute this century's thorn in the crown of local government administration.'

Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys,
46 MERCER L. REv. 1 (1994). The study was a part of the effort to summarize the surveys
of important developments in Georgia local government law over the past thirty years. It
purported to categorize topics litigated during the past three decades, to calculate the
frequency of their appearances in the appellate courts, and to highlight those topics proving
the most controversial. The article attempted to trace the thirty-year substantive
developments of the four most popular litigated topics and, finally, to obtain from the thenmembers of Georgia's appellate courts their impressions on the corpus of local government
law.
2. Id. at 11. The study reported a total of 1,563 surveyed cases and determined that
five subjects accounted for a remarkable 68% of those cases. Id.
3. Id. at 13. The other, but considerably lesser, dominating sub-topics were as follows:
"Zoning," "Officers and Employees," "Taxation," and "Powers." Id.
*
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A companion inquiry of the 1994 study engaged the oracles themselves-the justices and judges of Georgia's appellate courts.4 That
inquiry sought insight into the appellate judiciary's assessment of legal
issue complexity. How would the jurists generally characterize the level
of substantive difficulty inherent in local government cases that came
before them? Comparatively evaluated, could the analytical challenges
of local government law be even roughly calculated? Once again, the
results counseled rapt attention:
"As compared with issues in other cases," the question elaborated,
would respondents rate local government law issues to be: "of average
complexity"; "of less than average complexity"; or "of more than
average complexity"? Here, not a single respondent declined to answer;
four checked "average complexity," and seven deemed "greater than
average" to be the appropriate characterization.'
Ironically, at that precise point in time the Georgia Supreme Court
was initiating an epoch that would dramatically mesh the two surveyed
facets: (a) local government liability and (b) judicial complexity.' The
object of rather routine announcement, the formative issue would emerge
with deceptive casualness and, over a remarkably short evolution,
completely paralyze the court's analytical processes. Rarely in Georgia
law has the court so promptly suffered doctrinal default upon a deed of
its own doing.
Rarely has the court devolved to such devastating analytical divisiveness as that generated by the "Doctrine of Public Duty."
I.
One of the hornbook essentials to the tort of negligence is that of
"duty."' As a prerequisite to establishing a negligence cause of action,
plaintiff must affirmatively answer the following inquiry: "Dlid the
defendant owe the plaintiff a duty to conform his conduct to a standard
necessary to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to others?"' A failure
to furnish that answer dooms plaintiff's claim to dismissal, and no

4. Id. at 25-34.
5. Id. at 31.
6. See, e.g., City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
7. "The traditional formula for the elements necessary to [a negligence] cause of action
may be stated briefly as follows: (1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring
the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks.. . ." WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., TORTS 164 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
TORTS].
8. RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 166 (6th ed. 1995).

1999]

PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE

immunity issue ever arises. 9 Duty, as negligence law proclaims it,
constitutes a part of plaintiff's case and not a part of defendant's
defense."°
The "duty limitation" upon negligence liability looms large in the
common law's distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance:
misfeasance breaches a legal duty; nonfeasance generally does not."
Traditionally, therefore, the law refuses to impose a duty upon one
individual to take affirmative action for the benefit of another. 2 A
legendary instance of that refusal finds application in the context of
controlling the conduct of third parties. 3 Absent a special relationship
between them, one individual is under no duty to prevent a third person
from causing physical harm to another. 4 A plaintiff injured by the

9. "A plaintiff who brings a negligence action loses unless he establishes that the
defendant was guilty of negligence. He also loses if the defendant owed him no duty to use
care." CLARENCE MORRIS, TORTS 139 (1953).
10. "The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the essential elements of a cause
of action for negligence." 4 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed. 1986).
11.
Our law says that you do not have to volunteer to relieve others from dangers not
due to your own fault; but if you do volunteer-if you engage in some activity that
is followed by harm to such another-then a court may let a jury scrutinize what
If
you did and call it actionable negligence-no matter how hard you tried ....
you are not under a duty to "fease," then nonfeasance can never be held
actionable. But if you do engage in feasance toward anybody, then under most
circumstances you must "fease" carefully.
Charles Gregory, The Good Samaritanand the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23, 28 (James A. Ratcliffe ed., 1966). "Hence there arose
very early a difference, still deeply rooted in the law of negligence, between 'misfeasance'
and 'nonfeasance'-that is to say, between active misconduct working positive injury to
others and passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them from harm." TORTS,
supra note 7, at 373.
12. "The law does not compel active benevolence between man and man. It is left to
one's conscience whether he shall be the good Samaritan or not." James Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112 (1908). "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize
that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
13. "The distinction between affirmative conduct and the mere omission to act comes
into play in deciding whether an actor has the duty to control the conduct of others." 3
HARPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 732.
14.
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relationship exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
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third person thus shows no breach of legal duty by the defendant's
inaction and fails to establish the tort of negligence. 15
These general negligence principles permeate local government law.
Thus, one suing a local government in negligence must prove the
existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff and a breach of that duty by the
local government. 16 A plaintiff proves no such breach by showing only
a local government's inaction. Under the historical doctrine of public
duty, the local government owes its protections to the public at large and
not to any particular individual.' 7 A local government's failure to
provide police or fire protection, for instance, breaches no duty to an
injured individual and affords that individual no claim in negligence.'"
Accordingly, plaintiff's suit suffers dismissal, and no issue of local
government immunity ever arises. Absent a "special relationship"
between local government and victim, "the overwhelming current of
decisions continues to reject liability based on a general failure to
provide police protection." s
II.

The Georgia Supreme Court announced adoption of the public duty
0 Plaintiff in
doctrine in its 1993 decision of City of Rome v. Jordan.'
City of Rome alleged injury from an attack in her home; she also alleged
the city's negligent failure to dispatch police in response to several
telephone calls for assistance.2 ' Reversing the court of appeals,22 the

15. "[I]n the absence of the requisite relationship, there generally is no duty to protect
others against harm from third persons." TORTS, supra note 7, at 385.
16. "In accord with general tort principles, a plaintiff suing a local government must
prove the existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff, [and a] breach of that duty by the local
government...." 2 SANDRA STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35.06[1]
(1998).
17. "The public duty doctrine, which holds that some unspecified duties are owed only
to the public and that private individuals have no redress for their violation, appears to
have originated in T. Cooley, Liability of Public Officers (1877) and to have been repeated
...through its several editions." TORTS, supra note 7, at 1049 n.81.
18. TORTS, supra note 7, at 1049; 2 STEVENSON, supra note 16, at 35.06[2][b]; 5 HARPER
ET AL, supra note 10, at 639-43.
19. TORTS, supra note 7, at 1050. The public duty doctrine "reflects vestigial
distinctions between misfeasance and nonfeasance." 5 HARPER ET AL, supra note 10, at
642.
20. 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
21. Id. at 26, 426 S.E.2d at 861. Plaintiff, while home alone, was attacked by her
sister-in-law's estranged husband. Plaintiff called her sister-in-law who told her to allow

her husband to come in and that she would call the municipal police. Upon the sister-inlaw's call, the police dispatch officer told her a police car was on its way to plaintiffs home.

Subsequently, while plaintiff was still under attack, the sister-in-law called her, was told
that the police had not arrived, and assured plaintiff that she would call again. Plaintiff
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supreme court sustained the trial court's summary judgment that "the
City owed no duty to the [plaintiffl upon which liability could be
based."23
The supreme court's groundbreaking opinion, expressing the view of
six justices,24 initially pared the case of extraneous concerns. First, the
"threshold issue" was duty,25 a question preceding "any discussion of
sovereign immunity."2' This fact rendered immaterial to the case any
immunity waiver the state may have created for local governments.
Decreasing immunity could not increase duty.28 Second, "this case
involve[d] [a] municipality's failure to act, as opposed to any affirmative
act of negligence."2 9 The court thus perpetuated as seemingly pivotal
the common law's nonfeasance-misfeasance dichotomy.
As its primary ground for embracing the public duty doctrine, the
court stressed parity between governmental and private tortfeasors. °
"To impose liability on the City based on a general duty to protect all
citizens from the actions of third parties" would surpass both the "duty
and potential liability" traditionally imposed on individuals."
Contrarily, the public duty doctrine would confine governmental liability
"similarly to the manner in which the liability of a private party is
restricted."3 2 As a secondary justification for adopting public duty, the

argued that she did not attempt to fight her assailant because she thought the police were
coming. Id. at 30, 426 S.E.2d at 864.
22. Jordan v. City of Rome, 203 Ga. App. 662, 417 S.E.2d 730 (1992).
23. 263 Ga. at 26, 426 S.E.2d at 862. "We granted certiorari to determine '[t]he duty
of police officers of a city to respond to emergency requests for help.'" Id. at 27, 426 S.E.2d
at 862.
24. Justice Sears-Collins authored the opinion; Justice Fletcher agreed in a brief
concurrence. Id. at 26, 31, 426 S.E.2d at 861, 864.
25. "The threshold issue in any cause of action for negligence is whether, and to what
extent, the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care." Id. at 27, 426 S.E.2d at 862.
26. Id. at 27 n.1, 426 S.E.2d at 862 n.1.
27. Id. at 28, 426 S.E.2d at 862. "[W]e find that the abrogation or waiver of sovereign
immunity in Georgia did not create a duty on the part of a municipality where none existed
before." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 27 n.2, 426 S.E.2d at 862 n.2 (emphasis added).
30. The court quoted the "majority rule" to be that
liability does not attach where the duty owed by the governmental unit runs to the
public in general and not to any particular member of the public[,] [except where
there is] a special relationship between the governmental unit and the individual
giving rise to a particular duty owed to that individual.
Id. at 27, 426 S.E.2d at 862 (quoting 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, § 1[a] (1985)).
31. Id. at 28, 426 S.E.2d at 862.
32. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 863.

78

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

court stressed nonparity between governmental and private tortfeasors.33 Providing police protection to citizens was limited "'by the
resources of the community;"' it called for a "'legislative-executive decision'" on deployment, a function "'better left to the discretion of the
policy makers."'8 4 The adoption of the public duty doctrine freed the
exercise of that governmental discretion from the pressures of potential
tort liability.
Melding those contrasting rationales, the court enunciated its doctrine
of public duty: "[W]here failure to provide police protection is alleged,
there can be no liability based on a municipality's duty to protect the
general public." 5
With duty limitation in place, the court immediately emphasized its
restriction to "the general public." 6 Thus, the public duty doctrine
presented no bar to one possessing a special relationship to the local
government.37 That status "sets the individual apart from the general
public and engenders a special duty" entailing municipal obligation "for
the nonfeasance of its police department."38 The court adumbrated
three requirements for determining special relationship: 39 (a) the
municipality's "explicit assurance" of aid; (b) municipal knowledge that
"inaction could lead to harm"; and (c) the injured individual's "justifiable
and detrimental reliance" on the municipal undertaking.40

33. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 862-63.
34. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 863 (quoting Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 256,
543 N.E.2d 443, 445-46 (1989)).
35. Id.
36. Id. "However, in order to ensure responsibility and the utmost protection possible
within limited means, it is important that a municipality be accountable for its negligence
to some degree." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 28-29, 426 S.E.2d at 863.
39. Id. at 29, 426 S.E.2d at 863. "In order to determine whether such a special
relationship exists, we adopt the following requirements:" Id. The court expressly
"adapted" this test from Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987).
The court specifically deleted from the New York test the requirement "that there be 'direct
contact' between the injured party and the municipality." Id.
40. 263 Ga. at 29, 426 S.E.2d at 863. By footnote, the court specified the following
reservation:
Since the situation is not presented by the facts of this case, we do not determine
whether a special duty may exist even in the absence of a special relationship
where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime, has the knowledge and
the resources to act to the benefit of the injured party, yet does not act.
Id. at 29 n.4, 426 S.E.2d 863 n.4. It was upon this point that Justice Fletcher elaborated
by a concurrence: "I would go further than the majority, however, and adopt the direct
contact requirement as a necessary element in determining whether a special relationship
exists between a municipality and an injured party." Id. at 31,426 S.E.2d at 864 (Fletcher,
J., concurring).
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Finally, the court applied its test to plaintiff and held her lacking in
"detrimental reliance."4 1 Evidence revealed plaintiff to be unaware of
any police promise of assistance. 42 "Any reliance on her part on the
police arriving was based solely on a belief that the police would come
if called, not on any promise made by the police."43 Absent appropriate
reliance, plaintiff enjoyed no special relationship to the municipality."
Absent special relationship, plaintiff fell among the general public to
whom the municipality's inaction breached no duty.45 Accordingly,
plaintiff's negligence action became the first casualty of Georgia's public
duty doctrine.46
The only justice disagreeing with the court's exercise in City of Rome
feared, not its limitation on liability, but rather its potential lessening
of municipal immunity.4 7 The public duty doctrine's special relationship limitation "creates an across-the-board exception to governmental
immunity that is applicable where such immunity would otherwise be
a complete defense to the negligent performance of discretionary acts."4"
City of Rome thus introduced Georgia local governments to the public
duty doctrine. A near-unanimous supreme court lifted the principle from
the general negligence nucleus of common law torts, emphasizing its
conceptual isolation from governmental immunity. The court also
located the doctrine within its traditional context of nonfeasance-a
failure to act as opposed to an affirmative duty. So fashioned, the
doctrine served the court's contrasting policy grounds of both parity and
nonparity between private and governmental tortfeasors.
As announced, the doctrine operated subject to the exception of special
relationship, an exception imposing a rare tort duty of affirmative action.

41. Id. at 30, 426 S.E.2d at 864. "Applying the test for a special relationship to these
facts, we find there was no genuine issue of fact with regard to the requirement of
detrimental reliance." Id.
42. Id. "The evidence shows that [plaintiff] was not aware that the police had made
any promise of assistance, if in fact they did." Id.
43. Id. "To allow such an expression of reliance to satisfy the reliance requirement in
the special relationship test would render the requirement virtually meaningless." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. "Therefore, we find that the trial court was correct in granting summary
judgment based on a finding that there was no special relationship between [plaintiff] and
the municipality." Id.
47. Id. at 31, 426 S.E.2d at 865 (Hunstein, J., concurring specially).
48. Id. As indicated, this justice concurred with the court's judgment but on another
ground: "[T]he record is devoid of any evidence that the City had any police units available
to respond to [the telephone call] at that time. Hence, the record establishes that no
questions of fact remain regarding [defendants'] complete defense to [plaintiffs'] suit
alleging negligent failure to provide police protection." Id. at 32-33, 426 S.E.2d at 866.
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City of Rome not only structured the test for determining that relationship, it also instanced the supreme court's initial application. Special
relationship, that exercise indicated, would not find casual applicability.
Even at its inception, public duty drew disagreement within the court
itself. A dissenting opinion for a single justice not only confirmed that
point, it also demonstrated the confusing ease with which the doctrine
could be analytically commingled with the issue of governmental tort
immunity.
III.

For the next three years, Georgia's public duty doctrine evolved
exclusively from the court of appeals. Indeed, that evolution commenced
almost immediately in Feise v. Cherokee County,4 9 an action for injuries
received from a neighbor's attack.5 ° Although plaintiff had previously
suspected the neighbor of anonymous telephone threats, the police
possessed no evidence upon which to detain him prior to the attack.51
Working through City of Rome's special relationship requirements, the
court found no "explicit assurance" and no "justifiable and detrimental
reliance."52 Thus, "despite specific knowledge that inaction probably
would lead to harm," the police breached no negligence duty to plain53
tiff.

The court's succinctness accelerated in Smail v. Douglas
County,54 a claim for injuries to plaintiff's wife caused by a rock thrown
from an interstate highway bridge.55 Although the county had received
prior reports of debris thrown from the bridge,56 the court declared
plaintiff "unable to establish such a relationship between the county and

49. 209 Ga. App. 733, 434 S.E.2d 551 (1993). The court of appeals decided the case
some four months following the supreme court's decision in City of Rome v. Jordan.
50. In a previous decision, Feise v. Cherokee County, 207 Ga. App. 17, 427 S.E.2d 294
(1992), the court of appeals had reversed a summary judgment for the county. On
certiorari, the supreme court remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in City
of Rome v. Jordan. 428 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 1993).
51. 207 Ga. App. at 18, 427 S.E.2d at 295. Plaintiff had contacted the police with her
suspicions, but the police had been unable to find the caller. Id.
52. 209 Ga. App. at 734, 434 S.E.2d at 551-52.
53. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 552. The court thus affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
for the county. Id. A specially concurring opinion maintained that "there was no specific
action that [the police] reasonably failed to take." Id. at 735, 434 S.E.2d at 552 (Andrews,
J., concurring specially).
54. 210 Ga. App. 830, 437 S.E.2d 824 (1993).
55. The rock passed through the windshield of plaintiffs vehicle traveling on the
interstate and crushed plaintiffs wife to death. Id. at 830, 437 S.E.2d at 825.
56. The county had received such reports over a period of two months prior to the death
of plaintiffs wife. Id.
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his wife" as to impose liability for "the nonfeasance of its police
department.""7
The court first moved the public duty doctrine beyond law enforcement
in City of Lawrenceville v. Macko,5 s an action for the periodic flooding
of plaintiffs' home.5 9 In appraising a claim for municipal negligence in
inspecting the house and issuing the building permit, the court focused
upon the city's building code.6" That code declared its purpose as
protecting "the safety, health, and general welfare of its citizens;" it
created no "duty of care to any particular resident."6 Having thus
purported to establish the public duty limitation,6 2 the court considered
the possible exception of "special relationship."63 That exception's first
requirement, however, was lacking: the city made no "specific assurances
to [plaintiffs] or promises prior to the [house] inspection and approval."' Aside from any issue of immunity, the court explained, plaintiffs'
action failed "a traditional negligence analysis.""
By the conclusion of 1993, the calendar year of its Georgia birth, the
public duty doctrine had undergone substantial evolution. Entrusted
exclusively to the court of appeals, City of Rome's early progeny
evidenced no qualms in routinely immersing the doctrine in the corpus

57. Id. at 831, 437 S.E.2d at 825. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of
summary judgment for the county. Id.
58. 211 Ga. App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993).
59. A builder constructed the house; the city inspected it and issued a certificate of
occupancy; and plaintiffs subsequently purchased the house. Several months later,
plaintiffs experienced the first of three major floods in their garage. Id. at 312-13, 439
S.E.2d at 97.
60. Id. at 313, 439 S.E.2d at 97.
61. Id. at 315, 439 S.E.2d at 99. "Accordingly, any negligence in failing to properly
inspect property pursuant to the building codes and its negligence in the issuance of the
building permit does not create any duty of care to a particular resident." Id.
62. Id. "Although this 'public duty doctrine' has not been applied in this State to
municipalities ... involving the negligent inspections of homes or negligent issuance of
building permits, other jurisdictions have applied this doctrine to actions of a municipality
in this capacity." Id.
63. Id. "Applying this public duty doctrine to the facts of this case, we must determine
whether a special relationship existed between the [plaintiffs] and the City at the time that
the alleged negligent acts occurred." Id.
64. Id. at 315-16, 439 S.E.2d at 99. Although one of the plaintiffs testified that a city
representative promised to repair a drainage pipe after the first flood, the court held this
testimony hearsay. Id. at 316, 439 S.E.2d at 99. "Accordingly, this statement cannot be
used to establish the necessary assurance on behalf of the City to satisfy the special
relationship requirement in light of the explicit disclaimer provided by the City in its
building code." Id.
65. Id. at 315, 439 S.E.2d at 99. "As [plaintiffs] did not establish that a duty of care
was owed to them by the City based upon a special relationship, the trial court erred in
failing to grant the City's motion for directed verdict." Id. at 316, 439 S.E.2d at 99.
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of local government law. In the sphere of governmental negligence
liability, the court confirmed the doctrine's substantive focus on
sufficiency of the plaintiff's case, not the defendant's immunity. In the
context of origin, the nonfeasance of local government law enforcement,
the court virtually assumed doctrinal applicability. Such judicial
analysis as appeared went only to the principle's possible exception.
That exception, special relationship, proved no easy hurdle. Its
triumvirate elements of "assurance," "knowledge," and "reliance" resisted
casual acceptance.6 6 They were not satisfied by police awareness of
potentially impending harm, even to the individual plaintiff. Nor, it
appeared, could they be shown by the local government's initial
investigation in seeking to identify the likely danger source.
With City of Lawrenceville v. Macko the court abruptly moved the
public duty doctrine beyond both law enforcement and nonfeasance.
There, plaintiffs charged negligence in the governmental acts of
inspecting a house and issuing a building permit. Ignoring the absence
of nonfeasance, the court derived public duty applicability from a general
welfare declaration in the city building code. Because that declaration
created no duty of care to any particular resident, neither did the city's
inspection and approval of a particular resident's home."
Those
positive actions proved equally unavailing, moreover, to demonstrate
assurance, knowledge, and reliance for purposes of special relationship.
The analytical excesses of Macko brought tumultuous closure to
Georgia's initial evolution of public duty.
The focus reverted to law enforcement in Landis v. Rockdale County, 69 an action for the death of plaintiff's decedent caused by an

intoxicated driver. Some two hours prior to the fatal accident, a county
deputy sheriff had observed the intoxicated driver but failed to arrest
her.7
Plaintiff maintained that the deputy had thus breached a
negligence duty to the decedent.'
Rejecting the claim, the court of

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

City of Rome, 263 Ga. at 29, 426 S.E.2d at 863.
211 Ga. App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993).
Id. at 315, 439 S.E.2d at 99.
212 Ga. App. 700, 445 S.E.2d 264 (1994).
The "noticeably intoxicated driver who approached and spoke to [the officer] while

he was directing traffic at an intersection ....

[T]wo hours later, after the driver left a

party .... [the driver] caused an automobile accident which resulted in the death of the
plaintiffs husband." Id. at 700, 445 S.E.2d at 265.
71. Id. Plaintiff relied upon the supreme court's express reservation in City of Rome:
"[Wie do not determine whether a special duty may exist even in the absence of a special
relationship where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime, has the knowledge and
the resources to act to the benefit of the injured party, yet does not act." Id. at 701, 445
S.E.2d at 266 (citing City of Rome, 263 Ga. 26, 29 n.4, 426 S.E.2d 861,863 n.4 (1993)). The
court of appeals in Landis understood that reservation to contemplate "some circumstances

1999]

PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE

appeals emphasized that when the deputy confronted the driver, the
"decedent was not an identifiable victim in immediate danger of
harm."72 Thus, "the deputy's duty to enforce the drunk driving laws
was to the public in general, not specifically to plaintiff's decedent.""3
Accordingly, "defendants violated no duty for which they could be held
liable in tort for the plaintiff's claims."74
The court perpetuated its Landis approach one year later in resolving
Tilley v. City of Hapeville. s Tilley featured an action for the negligence
of a municipal police officer "in failing to warn or direct [plaintiff] away"
from an abandoned vehicle parked at night on an interstate highway.7"
Plaintiff sought recovery for injuries incurred when he collided head-on
with the vehicle.77 Applying City of Rome's public duty formula to the
"allege[d] various inactions,"78 the court also rejected the formula's
special relationship exception. 79 Finally, the court employed Landis to

where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime about to be perpetrated against the
citizen (who at that point is an identifiable victim) and the officer fails to act to protect the
citizen despite his ability to do so." Id. at 702, 445 S.E.2d at 266-67.
72. Id. at 702, 445 S.E.2d at 267. "At that point, the deputy sheriff had no contact with
plaintiff's decedent." Id.
73. Id.
A clear majority of states which have considered whether police officers have a
duty to restrain a drunk driver have followed the rationale of the "public duty"
doctrine, which, as adopted in City of Rome .... requires that liability be based
on facts establishing a duty owed to the injured individual rather than a duty to
protect the general public.
Id.
74. Id. at 705, 445 S.E.2d at 268-69. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to defendants. A dissenting opinion for two judges argued that City
of Rome should not apply to the extent of requiring direct contact between the governmental officer and the injured person. The duty "arises from the unique position, power,
knowledge of the officer, and foreseeability, to prevent the tort." Id. at 706-07, 445 S.E.2d
at 269-70 (Beasley, P.J., dissenting).
75. 218 Ga. App. 39, 459 S.E.2d 567 (1995).
76. Id. at 39, 459 S.E.2d at 568. The police officer testified that he was on the scene
and attempting to position his car for purposes of warning when plaintiff collided with the
parked vehicle. Plaintiff testified that he saw no police car nor any warning lights. Id. at
40, 459 S.E.2d at 568.
77. Id. at 39, 459 S.E.2d at 567.
78. Id. at 41, 459 S.E.2d at 569. The court asserted that plaintiff had charged no
'affirmative acts of negligence." Id. Rather, his "entire complaint alleges various inactions
by [the city] and [the officer]." Id.
79. Id. The court found no evidence of explicit assurance or detrimental reliance: "In
fact, the record demonstrates that before the collision [plaintiff] was not aware of the
existence of the [parked vehicle] or any efforts to remove it from the roadway." Id.
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rebut the argument of "special duty":" ° "When [the police officer]
arrived at the scene ... , [plaintiff] was not an identifiable victim in
immediate danger of harm."" Accordingly, "[the officer's] duty was
only to the general public and not to [plaintiffl." s2
Finally, the court evidenced no tendency toward backing off Macko's

earlier public duty extension beyond the setting of law enforcement.
Finley v. Lehmans presented a wrongful death action against a city
engineer present at a work site when an improperly shored ditch
collapsed on plaintiff's decedent.8 4 Rejecting a claim for defendant's
negligent failure to inspect the ditch, the court wasted no energy on
elaboration: "A private citizen does not have a cause of action for breach
of such a duty by a governmental employee in the absence of a special
relationship between the citizen and the governmental unit." 5 Giving
no "explicit assurance ...., through promises or action, that it would act
on behalf of the injured party," defendant had created no special
relationship. 86

80. The argument arose from Landis's observation that
a special duty to protect [a] citizen might be found under some circumstances
where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime about to be perpetrated
against the citizen (who at that point is an identifiable victim) and the officer
fail[ed] to act to protect the citizen despite his ability to do so.
212 Ga. App. at 702, 445 S.E.2d at 266-67.
81. 218 Ga. App. at 41, 459 S.E.2d at 569.
82. Id. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants.
Id. at 42, 459 S.E.2d at 569. •
83. 218 Ga. App. 789, 463 S.E.2d 709 (1995).
84. Defendant was present at the work site as a courtesy to the subdivision developer
to ensure compliance with city requirements. He testified that he made no inspections as
to the shoring of the ditch although he did observe that it was not being shored. Id. at 790,
463 S.E.2d at 710.
85. Id. at 791, 463 S.E.2d at 710-11.
86. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 711. The court thus affirmed summary judgment favoring
defendant. Id.
Other applications of the doctrine, within this time frame, included Washington v.
Jefferson County, 221 Ga. App. 81,470 S.E.2d 714 (1996), and Booth v. Firemen'sInsurance
Co., 223 Ga. App. 243, 477 S.E.2d 376 (1996). In the first case, the court rejected an action
for the death of plaintiffs son caused by a county arrestee out on bail. 221 Ga. App. at 81,
470 S.E.2d at 715. Marking an absence of any special relationship between the county and
the decedent, the court held there was no "duty to protect [decedent] any more than any
other member of the general public." Id. at 83, 470 S.E.2d at 716. The latter case featured
a charge that a county deputy sheriff breached his official bond in failing to serve plaintiffs
interests regarding a traffic altercation. 223 Ga. App. at 243, 477 S.E.2d at 377. Given
the absence of a special relationship between the parties, the court held, plaintiff "failed
to offer any evidence that [the deputy] had a duty under the law that ran specifically to
[plaintiff], which is an essential element in a cause of action against a deputy's bond." Id.
at 247, 477 S.E.2d at 380.

19991

PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE

85

IV.
The Georgia Supreme Court allowed three full years to pass before
addressing the public duty doctrine for the second time. In 1996,
however, Department of Transportationv. Brown 7 presented the court
an opportunity to revisit its creation. Brown featured a wrongful death
claim arising from a highway intersection collision. Plaintiff alleged
negligence in the DOT's opening the newly constructed intersection
before installing permanent traffic lights. As a result, plaintiff
maintained, decedent's driver ran a temporary stop sign resulting in the
collision.88 As one ground for its motion for directed verdict,89 the
DOT proffered the doctrine of public duty. 90 The court of appeals
affirmed denial of the motion, 9 and the supreme court granted the
DOT's petition for certiorari.
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court summarily affirmed that
public duty "has no impact on this case."92 Its decision in City of Rome,
the court briefly elaborated, "was directed squarely and only at the duty
owed by a governmental entity to provide police protection to individual
citizens."93 That duty involved "third parties whose behavior may be
unpredictable."94 In contrast, "[tihe duty DOT owes to each member of
the public does not involve third parties, only the way in which DOT's
performance or nonperformance of its duty impacts individuals." 95
"[T]hat difference in duties," the court concluded, "warrants limitation

87. 267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).
88. The DOT had rejected a bid for the installation of a traffic light signal to control
traffic in both directions but decided to proceed with opening the new intersection.
DOT erected temporary stop signs to control traffic in both directions on the crossroad, and made the new Hwy. 365 temporarily a through highway without any
traffic control signals. [Decedent] was killed when the car in which she was a
passenger was struck by a dump truck while the car was crossing Hwy. 365 after
failing to stop at the stop sign.
Id. at 6, 471 S.E.2d at 850.
89. The case was tried under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, with defendant claiming
exceptions to liability under that statute, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. Id.
90. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 851. "DOT also moved for a directed verdict based on the public
duty doctrine." Id. "Finally, DOT asserts that our decision in City of Rome v. Jordan
requires the conclusion that, absent some special relation between DOT and the victim of
its alleged negligence, it has no liability." Id. at 8, 471 S.E.2d at 852 (citation omitted).
91. Department of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995).
92. 267 Ga. at 9, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
93. Id. at 8, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
94. Id. "The essential difference between that duty and the duty at issue in this case
is the involvement of third parties whose behavior may be unpredictable." Id.
95. Id.
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of the public duty doctrine adopted in [City of Rome v. Jordan] to the
situation involved there, the provision of police services." 96 Thus, the
DOT could not avoid negligence liability by availing itself of the public
duty doctrine.9"
With its decision in Brown, therefore, the supreme court purported,
somehow, to limit the doctrine it had birthed in City of Rome. The
limitation turned, the court indicated, upon the difference in duties
involved in the two cases.98 The municipality's employee in City of
Rome provided police protection to individual citizens; the state's
employee in Brown did not.99 City police protection involved third
parties; DOT employee services did not.'
Third-party behavior may
be unpredictable; DOT employee duties involved no such behavior.''
This difference in duties limited the public duty doctrine to the situation
involved in City of Rome: "the provision of police services."' 2
Neither of the court's indicated distinctions wore well upon reflection.
Many duties of DOT employees were as "protective" to members of the
general public as the duties performed by city police. Indeed, both
classes of employees bore responsibility for public highway safety. As for
intervening, unpredictable, third-party behavior, what essential
difference delineated plaintiff's unlawful attacker in City of Rome and
plaintiff's unlawful driver in Brown? Both were intervening third
parties, and the conduct of each was unpredictable. Moreover, how did
the court's reasons for adopting the public duty doctrine in City of Rome
render the doctrine so unsuited for the circumstances of Brown?
Initially, what of the historic misfeasance-nonfeasance dichotomy: a
pivotal point in City of Rome but completely ignored in Brown? Second,
why does the court's desire for parity between governmental and private
tortfeasors, so crucial in City of Rome, fade from view in Brown?
Finally, what of the court's earlier overarching concern for freeing the
discretion of resource deployment from the pressures of tort liability?
Why does that concern not augur equally for the DOT's resource
deployment discretion? The unanswered questions all coalesced to the
same basic quandary: How did the DOT's failure to provide a traffic
light, as opposed to the city's failure to provide police protection, both

96. Id. at 8-9, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
97. Id. at 7, 471 S.E.2d at 851. "[H]aving determined that the Court of Appeals was
correct in affirming the trial court's judgment, we affirm that of the Court of Appeals." Id.
98. Id. at 8-9, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
99. Id. at 8, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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obligations owed to the public at large, yield a legitimate line of
limitation?
Less than a year later, the supreme court applied its Brown decision
to Hamilton v. Cannon. °3 Hamilton presented a wrongful death claim
charging an "affirmative act of gross negligence" by a county deputy
sheriff.' °4 The claim specified the deputy's interruption of a private
CPR attempt upon the unconscious decedent at a public swimming
pool.'0 5 Plaintiff brought the action in federal district court only to
suffer summary judgment based on the public duty doctrine.'
Upon
plaintiff's appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, 0 7 that court submitted the
following question to the Georgia Supreme Court: "Does the 'public duty
doctrine' established in City of Rome apply outside
the police protection
08
context and in the circumstances of this case?"
By a four-to-three division of its membership, 10 9 the supreme court
declared Brown "conclusive" upon its answer to Hamilton."° Accordingly, "the public duty doctrine adopted in City of Rome is limited to the
situation in that case and thus does not apply outside the police

103. 267 Ga. 655, 482 S.E.2d 370 (1997).
104. Id. at 655, 482 S.E.2d at 371.
105. Plaintiff asserted that deceased collapsed as she emerged from the city swimming
pool, that a pool patron began successfully administering CPR, that the deputy sheriff was
called to the scene and, upon arrival, ordered everyone to clear away thus causing the
patron to cease the CPR efforts. Plaintiff alleged the sheriffs "affirmative act of gross
negligence ... when he interrupted a private rescue attempt without providing a
meaningful alternative." Id.
106. Hamilton v. Cannon, 864 F. Supp. 1332 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
107. Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1996).
108. 267 Ga. at 655, 482 S.E.2d at 372. The court also submitted the additional
questions:
(2) Does the City of Rome public duty doctrine apply to affirmative acts of
negligence, such as those alleged in this case, in addition to failures to act? (3)
Does the "reliance prong" of the City of Rome special relationship test require an
objective manifestation of assent by the plaintiff, or may assent be inferred from
the reliance of others or from the circumstances of this case? (4) Does the City of
Rome special relationship test apply when a law enforcement officer acts with
gross negligence in performing duties at the scene of an emergency, as is alleged
in this case, such that the officer would not otherwise be shielded from liability by
O.C.G.A. § 35-1-7?
Id. at 655-56, 482 S.E.2d at 372.
109. Justice Hunstein wrote the majority opinion, noting that Brown was rendered two
months after the Eleventh Circuit certified the questions in this case. Id. at 657, 482
S.E.2d at 372. Chief Justice Benham, and Justices Carley and Thompson apparently
concurred. Id. at 656-57, 482 S.E.2d at 372.
110. Id. at 656,482 S.E.2d at 372. In Brown, "[tihis court rejected the DOT's assertion
that it had no liability in the absence of a special relationship between the DOT and the
plaintiffs decedent, a car collision victim." Id.
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protection context.""' Georgia's public duty doctrine, it resulted, did
2
not preclude plaintiff's claim for the deputy's conduct in Hamilton.1
Hamilton's dissenting opinion criticized the court's answer as "shorter
than the question" and as relying upon a case (Brown) "that also states
a result without any persuasive reasoning."" 3 Charging the court with
"unnecessarily and unwisely limit[ing] the public duty doctrine,"" 4 the
dissent urged its applicability "to police and other public employees who
provide police services.""' Such "services" should include "preserving
public order; promoting public health, safety, and morals; and preventing, detecting and punishing crime.""' That formulation reached the
actions of this deputy sheriff "who performed traditional police services."" 7 Finally, the dissent proposed a further extension: "the public
duty doctrine should apply to affirmative acts of negligence as well as
the failure to act."" 8
With the public duty doctrine applied, the dissent turned to the special
relationship exception. That exception was not limited to the requirements stated in City of Rome but could also be established by an officer's
voluntarily assuming "to act for the protection of injured persons at an
emergency scene."1' 9 In Hamilton, the dissent maintained, the depu-

111. Id.
112. Id. at 656-57, 482 S.E.2d at 372. "Accordingly, we answer the first certified
question in the negative. Our resolution of the first question renders it unnecessary for
us to address the remaining questions, all of which are premised upon the extension of the
public duty doctrine outside the police protection context." Id.
113. Id. at 657, 482 S.E.2d at 372 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting). Justices Sears and Hines
concurred in the dissent. Id.
114. Id. at 657, 482 S.E.2d at 372-73. "This result excludes other public employees who
are charged with protecting the general public from the actions of third persons in
emergency situations, such as firefighters. It also exposes police officers to liability when
their actions fall 'outside the police protection context.'" Id. at 658, 482 S.E.2d at 373.
115. Id. at 659, 482 S.E.2d at 374.
116. Id. "This definition protects public employees who provide police services from
unreasonable liability and protects local governments from unreasonable interference with
their decisions on allocating limited community resources." Id.
117. Id. The deputy was "a law enforcement officer who performed traditional police
services when he responded to the call for an ambulance, turned on his siren and blue
lights while driving to the pool, and exercised crowd control at the emergency scene." Id.
118. Id. The dissent argued that "the nature of the negligent act is more relevant to
the issue of whether a special relationship exists than whether a special relationship is
required .... I would evaluate allegations of affirmative acts of negligence as part of the
special relationship analysis." Id. at 660, 482 S.E.2d at 374-75.
119. Id. at 661, 482 S.E.2d at 375.
This duty is based not on a general duty to protect the public; rather, it is based
on the specific actions of the police officer at the scene of the emergency in
exercising control over an identifiable individual and voluntarily undertaking to
assist that person. Like private persons who act as Good Samaritans, police
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ty's rescue actions set the decedent apart from the general public and
"engender[ed] a special duty owed by the county to her."12 ° Accordingly, the deputy "had a special duty to not worsen [decedent's] condition
by stopping an ongoing, private rescue effort that may have
had
121
successful results, without offering a reasonable alternative."
The Georgia Supreme Court thus stood impaled upon its own doctrinal
petard. Obviously, the doctrine of public duty-a concept of its own
modern adoption-had assumed a status of deep divisiveness within the
court. In the period of less than one year, 122 the justices' position of
unanimity had deteriorated to one of virtual, and substantial, deadlock.
In its two decisions of the period, its only public duty decisions since City
of Rome, the court denied the doctrine's application. Virtually oblivious
to the court of appeals three-year evolution, the court provided the
principle only the most elementary analysis. In Brown the court
summarily centered upon the behavior of third parties and "the provision
of police services" as its guiding (limiting) standards. 23 In Hamilton
the court "conclusively" narrowed "police services" to "police protection,"
thereby denying the doctrine's coverage to most police conduct.'24 In
Brown no justice registered a note of analytical discord; in Hamilton the
discord was both defining and deafening.
Disturbed, perhaps, by their own previous conceptual complacence, the
Hamilton dissenters criticized the court for its stylistic casualness with
issues "deserv[ing] a more thoughtful discussion."125 They also countered the court's substantive limitation of the public duty doctrine.
First, the dissent urged a considerable broadening of police services: both
the types of included functions, and the types of "public employees" who
performed them.'26 Second, the dissent counseled the public duty
doctrine's outright extension to governmental actions as well as

officers who engage in the rescue of an injured person have a special duty not to
make that person's situation worse or affirmatively increase the harm associated
with that person's circumstances.

Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 661-62, 482 S.E.2d at 376.
122. The supreme court decided Department of Transportation v. Brown on June 17,
1996; the court decided Hamilton v. Cannon on March 21, 1997.
123. Brown, 267 Ga. at 8-9, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
124. Hamilton, 267 Ga. at 656, 482 S.E.2d at 372.
125. Id. at 657, 482 S.E.2d at 372 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 657-59, 482 S.E.2d at 373-74.
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inactions.' 27 These operative expansions coalesced convincingly, the
dissenters maintained, with City of Rome's precipitating rationale.'2 8
To counterbalance its proposed expansions of the doctrine, the dissent
also advanced a liberalization of its exceptions. The special relationship
exception could be triggered by factors other than those enumerated in
City of Rome.' 29 Thus, the relationship might be established by a
governmental effort at rescue which increased the victim's harm."' ° In
this fashion, the dissent advocated, common law misfeasance went not
13
to the public duty doctrine's applicability but rather to its exception. '
These operative limitations coalesced convincingly, the dissenters
32
maintained, with City of Rome's precipitating rationale.
By early 1997, therefore, the promise of Georgia's public duty doctrine
was one of high uncertainty.
V.
Because the supreme court would not add to the vicissitudes of
Georgia's public duty doctrine for another two years, evolution reverted
once again to the court of appeals. Initially, that court carried out the
assignment minus analytical fanfare.
For instance, the court summarily employed the doctrine against an
employee's claim that the county failed to vaccinate him for hepatitis
B. "33
'
Declaring the action deficient in duty, the court emphasized
plaintiff's failure "to offer any evidence establishing the existence of a
special relationship between him and the public officials or an affirmative undertaking taken on his behalf."'3 4
Conversely, the court rejected the doctrine's application against a
complaint that the city's Fourth-of-July parade route endangered the
safety of spectators. 13
In reversing summary judgment for the

127. Id.
128. Id. at 659, 482 S.E.2d at 374.
129. Id. at 660, 482 S.E.2d at 375.
130. Id. at 660-61, 482 S.E.2d at 375.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 664, 482 S.E.2d at 377.
133. Diaz v. Gwinnett County, 225 Ga. App. 807, 485 S.E.2d 42 (1997). In this case,
decided only ten days after the supreme court's decision in Hamilton v. Cannon, plaintiff
alleged that he contracted hepatitis B while working as an undercover narcotics
investigator and that his supervisors failed to vaccinate him. Id. at 807, 485 S.E.2d at 43.
134. Id. at 808, 485 S.E.2d at 43. The court simply cited the supreme court's decision
in City of Rome and affirmed the trial judge's grant of a summary judgment for defendants.
Id. at 808-09, 485 S.E.2d at 44.
135. Queen v. City of Douglasville, 232 Ga. App. 68, 500 S.E.2d 918 (1998). Plaintiffs
two small daughters were struck by a train on a railroad track that was parallel and
adjacent to the parade route which had been used for many years. Id. at 68, 500 S.E.2d
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municipality, the court explained the trial judge's actions as preceding
the supreme court's Hamilton decision. 136 That decision now "limits
3
the public duty doctrine to police officers and to police protection."1 1
In designating the parade route and failing to provide protection against
known hazards, the city's alleged negligence went "beyond issues of
police protection to the choices made ...in planning the parade." 3 '
The appropriate "police protection" context reappeared in a negligence
action for municipal failure to prevent unlicensed children from driving
on public roads.3 9
Rejecting plaintiff's claim for her husband's
death, 4 ° the court quoted City of Rome's familiar precept: "'[W]here
failure to provide police protection is alleged, there can be no liability
based on a municipality's duty to protect the general public.'"' 4 ' The
claim of special relationship fared no better:'
"In fact, [plaintiff]
stated that no official with the Town ...ever promised
her they were
43
going to do something and then did not try to do it."
The court of appeals prevailing calm on the issue unaccountably
1
shattered asunder with its treatment of Coffey v. Brooks County.'
The case featured an action by motorists who wrecked their vehicles on

at 919.
136. Id. at 70, 500 S.E.2d at 921. "In concluding that there was no evidence of the
City's negligence, the superior court relied upon the public duty doctrine set forth in City
of Rome v. Jordan. The summary judgment being appealed was entered before the decision
in Hamilton v. Cannon." Id. (citation omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id. "The negligence claim presents genuine issues of material fact for resolution
by a jury." Id. See also Dollar v. Dalton Public Schools, 233 Ga. App. 827, 505 S.E.2d 789
(1998), a case rejecting not the public duty doctrine's applicability but rather its exception.
Plaintiff sued the public school district for injuries to her small child on playground
equipment. Id. at 827, 505 S.E.2d at 789.
[Plaintiffs] reliance on City of Rome v. Jordanas authority for her argument that
the school district had a special duty of care to her, is misplaced. The Supreme
Court of Georgia has held that the public duty doctrine adopted in City of Rome
does not apply outside of the police protection context.
Id. at 828, 505 S.E.2d at 790 (citation omitted).
139. Dybas v. Town of Chester, 234 Ga. App. 113, 505 S.E.2d 274 (1998).
140. Plaintiffs 89-year-old husband was walking on the right side of the road when
struck by a 13-year-old driver. Id. at 113, 505 S.E.2d at 275.
141. Id. at 114, 505 S.E.2d at 275 (quoting City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 28, 426
S.E.2d 861, 863 (1993)).
142. The court enumerated City of Rome's three special relationship requirements and
observed that "by her own admission [plaintiff] cannot meet the third part of the test for
a special relationship because neither she nor her husband ever justifiably or detrimentally
relied on any affirmative undertaking by the town." Id. at 114-15, 505 S.E.2d at 276.
143. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment to the
town. Id.
144. 231 Ga. App. 886, 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998).
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a county road washed out by an unusually heavy rainstorm.14 5
Plaintiffs sued the county, its officers, and its employees, alleging
negligence in failing to properly inspect and barricade the road.146
Those charges, the court formalized, "involve[d] various claims based on
[defendants'] omissions, rather than any affirmative act of negligence by
them."'4 7 So synthesized, the case proved analytically irresistible: it
enticed the entire court into confronting the current status of Georgia's
public duty doctrine.
First, the court struggled to divine the precise limitations the supreme
court had levied upon City of Rome by Brown and Hamilton. Those
limitations centered upon "police protection to individual citizens"'48
and "acts or omissions of third parties whose behavior may be unpredictable."' 49 Seemingly, the court ventured, they excluded from the public
duty doctrine's protection any "public servants other than those engaged
in [or responsible for] law enforcement activities." 5 °
Given those "somewhat imprecisely defined limitations," 5' the court
proffered several "first impression" views about them. 52 In respect to
covered law enforcement activities, police protection should be broader
than merely protecting against third-party criminal activity; it should
include "certain other protective police services."5 3 Moreover, the
doctrine should cover services protective against naturally caused
hazardous conditions as well as conditions resulting from the negligence
of "some third-party persons or entities."5 4 Based on these views, the
court inferred that county "law enforcement officers were engaged in
police protection of the public when they inspected and elected whether

145. Plaintiffs sought recovery for both wrongful death and injuries sustained in the
wrecks. Id. at 886, 500 S.E.2d at 344.
146. Defendants included the county, the sheriff, deputy sheriffs, road superintendents,
and employees. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. "The public duty doctrine, however, has been limited in application to
situations involving the duty owed by a governmental entity 'to provide police protection
to individual citizens.'" Id. (quoting Department of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. at 8, 471
S.E.2d at 852).
149. Id. "The public duty doctrine likewise appears to have been limited to situations
involving the acts or omissions of third parties whose behavior may be unpredictable." Id.
150. Id. at 887, 500 S.E.2d at 344. The court observed that this would limit any
applicability of the doctrine in this case to the county, the sheriff, and his deputies. Id.
151. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 344-45.
152. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 344.
153. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 344-45.
154. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 345.
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to blockade public roads within the county which were in various stages
of flooding."155
The court of appeals recognized, however, that its inferences could not
withstand the supreme court's express limitations: "police protection to
56
individual citizens," and "acts or omissions of third parties."'
Accordingly, the court reluctantly concluded, "we are compelled not to
extend the public duty doctrine to ... the law enforcement officers
engaged in the protection of the public at large from hazardous
conditions caused by the weather rather than by a third party."'57 On
these grounds, plaintiffs in Coffey did not need to clear the hurdle of
public duty.
It would be difficult to miss the note of analytical exasperation, indeed
outright bafflement, exuded by the court of appeals opinion in Coffey.
The doctrine of public duty, the court implied, plays a legitimate role of
liability limitation in local government law. 5 ' It provides negligence
law's general duty protection to local government inaction under
emergency conditions.
Since originally announcing the doctrine,
however, the supreme court has unaccountably blunted its reach to a
status of paralyzing uncertainty. That its requirements could not
logically be exacted of plaintiffs in the circumstances of Coffey sufficiently illustrated the point. In the event the supreme court would not
"revisit" its "imprecisely defined limitations," the court of appeals
candidly counseled appeal to the General Assembly.'59 In the wake of
such consternation, would the supreme court respond?

155. Id.
156. Id. at 888, 500 S.E.2d at 345.
157. Id. "Thus, unless the Supreme Court revisits this issue, future protection, by the
public duty doctrine, of law enforcement officials in situations involving hazardous or
emergency conditions such as this may depend upon the will of the General Assembly."
Id. Having thus disposed of defendants' public duty argument, the court proceeded to a
discussion of both governmental and official immunity in the case. Regarding its eventual
decisions on immunity, there was a specially concurring opinion as well as a dissenting
opinion. These, however, went only to the immunity determination and not to the decision
on public duty. Id. at 894, 500 S.E.2d at 349 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially); Id. at
896, 500 S.E.2d at 350 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). As to the latter, the court appeared to be
unanimous.
158. Id. at 887-88, 500 S.E.2d at 345.
159. Id. at 888, 500 S.E.2d at 345.
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VI.
The Georgia Supreme Court took the case on certiorari (under the
style of Rowe v. Coffey),6 0 and promptly disintegrated. A bare majority of four justices-a "majority" by virtue of two opinions for two justices
each-reversed the court of appeals.'6 1 Accordingly, the public duty
doctrine protected the county law enforcement officers in Coffey against
negligence claims resulting from the washed out road.'62 That result,
however, represented the full extent of judicial consensus in the case.
Otherwise, Coffey revealed a supreme court completely at odds over a
doctrine it had introduced into local government law only six years
earlier. It was a doctrine, moreover, which the court had unanimously
refined some three years following introduction. A mere description of
Coffey's four opinions well indicates not only the depth of the dissention
but the diversity of the focus."
The first opinion in the case (referred to as the "majority") reflected
the views of but two justices; 64 it joined with another two-justice
opinion to constitute the court's controlling position.6 5 This "majority"
opinion reviewed the court of appeals reading of the limitations imposed
on City of Rome by Brown and Hamilton." The lower court understood those limitations as refusing to extend the public duty doctrine to
the facts of Coffey: i.e., "law enforcement officers engaged in the
protection of the public at large from hazardous conditions caused by the
weather rather than by a third party." 67 In retrospect, the "majority"
opinion indicated, Brown's reference to "third parties" was misleading;... thus, "a better expression.., would simply have been that City

160. 270 Ga. 715, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999). "This court granted the writ of certiorari and
posed the question, 'Whether the public duty doctrine applies in this case.'" Id. at 715, 515
S.E.2d at 376.
161. Id. at 716-17, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
162. Id. at 716, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
163. There was the two-justice 'majority" opinion constituting a part of the "controlling"
order of reversal; there was a two-justice "specially concurring" opinion constituting the
other part of the "controlling" order; there was a two-justice dissenting opinion; and there
was a one-justice dissenting opinion.
164. Chief Justice Benham wrote this opinion; Justice Hines apparently concurred. Id.
at 715, 515 S.E.2d at 376.
165. Id. at 717, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
166. Id.
167. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 376.
168. Id. at 715-16, 515 S.E.2d at 376-77. "Looking back at the language used in Dept.
of Transp. v. Brown .... we see that language used in distinguishing the situation in that
case from the situation in City of Rome could fairly be interpreted as the Court of Appeals
did in this case." Id.
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of Rome involved police protection and Department of Transportationv.
Brown did not."'6 9 In turn Hamilton "should be read only to limit the
application of the [public duty] doctrine to situations involving police
protection in general." 7 ° Although still not prepared to set "exact
limits" on covered "protective police services,""' the "majority" held
those services to include the actions of the officers in Coffey. 7'
According to the "majority" (two-judge) opinion in Coffey, therefore,
confusion over the public duty doctrine could be eliminated by some
73
subtle maneuvering of the supreme court's prior impreciseness.
Although the doctrine still covered only protective police services, those
services included police protection in general. 74 That protection,
moreover, need not be directed only against unpredictable third-party
behavior; protection against impending natural dangers could trigger the
doctrine as well.' 75 All Brown and Hamilton had been about, it
resulted, was limiting City of Rome to the failure to provide police
protection and excluding the DOT's alleged negligence.
The second two-justice opinion in Coffey (termed a "special concurrence") 7 ' apparently agreed with the "majority" in reversing the court
of appeals. 7 7 Beyond that, the concurrence paid virtually no attention
to Coffey itself but focused rather upon a larger synthesis 17'-a

169. Id. at 716, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
170. Id. "City of Rome may be fairly read to limit the scope of the doctrine to the police
protection context, but neither City of Rome, nor Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, nor Hamilton
v. Cannon expressly limits the application of the doctrine to protection from the acts of
third parties." Id.
171. Id. "The scope of 'police protection' is broad enough to include, as the Court of
Appeals reasoned in this case, other protective police services." Id.
172. Id.
While we do not undertake in this case to set out the exact limits of those services,
we take note of the persuasive foreign authority cited by the Court of Appeals in
its opinion in this case, applying the public duty doctrine in the context of
"hazardous conditions caused by nature," and conclude that the scope of police
protection for the purposes of the public duty doctrine includes the activities
undertaken by [the officers] in this case.
Id. (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 715-16, 515 S.E.2d at 376-77.
174. Id. at 716, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
175. Id.
176. Justice Sears wrote this opinion; Presiding Justice Fletcher concurred. Id. at 717,
515 S.E.2d at 377.
177. Id. at 718, 515 S.E.2d at 378 (Sears, J., concurring). The concurrence conceded
that the court's prior decisions 'have engendered uncertainty in its application," citing the
court of appeals decision in the present case. Id.
178. Id. "Ibelieve, therefore, that this appeal presents a ripe opportunity to clarify the
doctrine's applicability and scope." Id.
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complete "restatement" of Georgia's public duty doctrine.179 On the
one hand, this restatement would explicitly broaden covered police
services to include "preserving public order; promoting public health,
safety, and morals; and preventing, detecting and punishing crime."8 0
A local government's failure to provide those services would receive the
protection of the public duty doctrine.'
On the other hand, the
restatement would add to the doctrine's limitations.' 82 First, it would
retain the special relationship exception (created, as previously, by the
elements of assurance, knowledge, and reliance).8 3 Additionally, the
restatement would enforce a "particularized duty to an individual" when
"one with a duty to provide police services is present at the scene of a
crime or emergency, has knowledge of the danger
and resources to aid
" 184
an injured or imperilled party, yet fails to act.
Under this reformulation, the concurrence conjectured, the public duty
doctrine would still apply in City ofRome (involving a failure to provide
police services and no special relationship); and it still would not apply
in Brown (involving no failure to provide police services but rather the
"faulty design of an intersection").8 5 Hamilton's decision that the
doctrine did not apply, however, "should be overruled."' Under the
restatement Hamilton would now meet the expanded exception: "[I]t
involved a law enforcement officer providing police services and arriving
at the scene of an emergency18 7with knowledge of the danger and
resources to aid the individual."

179.
....

Id. at 719, 515 S.E.2d at 379. "I would restate the public duty doctrine as follows:
Id.

180. Id. The concurrence adopted these broadened police services from the dissenting
opinion in Hamilton v. Cannon, 267 Ga. 655, 659, 482 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1997) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting). 270 Ga. at 719, 515 S.E.2d at 378-79.
181. 270 Ga. at 719, 515 S.E.2d at 379 (Sears, J., concurring).
182. Id. (Sears, J., concurring). "I believe that the doctrine should be expanded to
include a provision for a particularized duty to an individual to arise separately from the
formulation of a 'special relationship' as contemplated in City of Rome." Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 720, 515 S.E.2d at 379. "This Court's decision in City of Rome would have
been the same under the restated doctrine ....
Likewise, the result would have been the
same in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown.. . ." Id.
186. Id. at 720, 515 S.E.2d at 380. "[U]nder the public duty doctrine as restated in this
concurrence, the answer to the first certified question in Hamilton would have been
different. The 11th Circuit asked, '(1) Does the "public duty doctrine" established in City
of Rome apply outside the police protection context and in the circumstances of this case?'
Id., 515 S.E.2d at 379.
187. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 380. "[T]he holding in Hamilton that the doctrine did not apply
would be incorrect under the doctrine as restated in this concurrence." Id.
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The "special concurrence" of Coffey thus agreed only with the
"majority's" decision to reverse; it differed dramatically in its suggested
approach to clarifying the confusion the court had inflicted upon the
public duty doctrine. Rather than a subtle maneuvering of nuances, the
concurrence labored to unfold a self-styled "restatement" of the doctrine
itself. Its substitute moved far beyond the "majority's" grudging
concession that the doctrine's police services concept must be broadened. 8' Instead, the concurrence advanced a specifically crafted
formulation of the concept-ranging from addressing crime to promoting
the public's order, health, and morals. A local government's failure to
provide any of these public safety services would draw the coverage of
the restated public duty doctrine. Contrarily, the concurrence also
broadened the doctrine's exceptions. In addition to, and explicitly
separate from, the special relationship limitation, the restatement
fashioned an exception based on "presence," "knowledge," and "resources."189 One failing to provide police services in those circumstances
breached a "particularized duty" to an imperilled individual.' 90
Accordingly, the public duty doctrine would not bar that individual's
negligence action.
As noted, the concurrence purported to apply its restatement
formulation to each of the court's prior public duty cases. (Ironically, the
only case upon which the concurrence did not expressly demonstrate was
the case before it-Coffey.) As tested, the decisions in both City of Rome
and Brown, opposite in result, were confirmed. 9' Hamilton, however,
presented a problem. Because it featured a provider of police services
possessed of presence, knowledge, and resources, it fell within the
restatement's newly crafted exception. Accordingly, the court should
have advised the Eleventh Circuit that the public duty doctrine did
apply, and "Hamilton should be overruled." 92
This treatment of Hamilton is intriguing. The court's original decision
held that the public duty doctrine did not apply; thus, plaintiff's suit
successfully hurdled the no-duty limitation of negligence law. Now, the
concurrence asserts, Hamilton falls under its new exception, with the
result that the public duty doctrine does apply.'93 The exception,
however, operates to free the case from the public duty doctrine. The
result is that the plaintiff's suit will successfully hurdle the no-duty

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 716, 515
Id. at 719, 515
Id.
Id. at 720, 515
Id., 515 S.E.2d
Id.

S.E.2d at 377.
S.E.2d at 379.
S.E.2d at 379.
at 380.
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limitation of negligence law. In effect, therefore, the concurrence
declared the case under the doctrine because it meets the exception
which frees the case from the doctrine! The result in Hamilton is the
same whether the doctrine does not apply or whether the doctrine's
exception does apply.
Coffey's third opinion (expressly labeled a "dissent") reflected the views
of two justices.'94 This opinion characterized City of Rome's public
duty doctrine as a means of holding a municipality "liable for its failure
to protect individuals from the criminal acts of third parties where a
'special relationship' existed."'95 The dissent's emphasis, therefore,
went exclusively to the "exception" part of the concept rather than to its
duty-limitation essence. That focus facilitated the dissent's view of the
public duty doctrine as one imposing rather than limiting local
government liability. That view, in turn, yielded the substantive context
for the dissent's blistering objections to the "majority's" decision.
The dissent charged the "majority" with "disapproving Brown,"
"overruling Hamilton,"and effecting an unwarranted "expansion of the
public duty doctrine." 96 The "majority," the dissent asserted, "cannot
even resolve the straightforward issue of what constitutes 'protective
police services."" 97 The erroneous result was to extend the public duty
doctrine beyond the confines of "nonfeasance" 9 ' and to "pierce immunity defenses."'9 9 In sum, the dissent forcefully protested "expanding the
public duty doctrine to acts of misfeasance committed by public
employees who are not operating to protect individuals from the criminal
acts of third parties."2 ° °
The two-justice dissenting opinion of Coffey thus refused to view the
public duty doctrine as one of duty limitation. Focusing rather upon the
doctrine's special relationship exception, the dissent deemed the

194. Justice Hunstein wrote the dissenting opinion; Justice Thompson concurred. Id.
at 721, 723, 515 S.E.2d at 380-81.
195. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 380 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The majority holds "without any discussion whatsoever-that the public duty
doctrine applies to a case involving an allegation of misfeasance." Id.
199. Id.
Prior to the majority's holding in this case, a deputy sheriff who rendered aid to
an injured person at an automobile accident scene was immune from liability for
both malfeasance and nonfeasance except where gross negligence was involved.
OCGA § 35-1-7. Under the public duty doctrine, however, the deputy may now be
held liable for acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance whenever the plaintiff
establishes that a "special relationship" existed between the parties.
Id. at 722, 515 S.E.2d at 380-81.
200. Id. at 722-23, 515 S.E.2d at 381.
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principle an imposition of local government liability.2 1 It was a
doctrine, indeed, operating to pierce the defenses of governmental
immunity.20 2 When the dissent lamented the "majority's" "expan[sion]"
of the public duty doctrine,0 3 therefore, it intended condemnation of
an undue limitation upon governmental immunity-not liability.
Although it bemoaned "the dire consequences of extending this judiciallycreated immunity," the dissent's concern centered upon expanding
responsibility.2 0 4 That concern went to confounding the misfeasancenonfeasance dichotomy and to public employees who fail to protect
others from third-party criminal acts.
The final opinion of Coffey (a separate "dissent") expressed the view
of one justice. 20 ' Disagreeing with the "majority," this dissent rejected
applicability of the public duty doctrine to defendants in this case.20 '
On the other hand, the opinion also disputed the two-justice dissent on
the nature of the doctrine itself.207 As announced in City of Rome,
public duty was not "an across-the-board exception to governmental
209
immunity 20" nor "a means of piercing an immunity defense."
Rather, "[tihe question of duty ... precede[s] and [is] separate and
distinct from the issue of the defense of immunity."2 0 Accordingly, the
21
public duty doctrine limits local government liability-not immunity. '
Indeed, it was "[for that reason alone" (i.e., liability limitation)
that the
21 2
doctrine "ought to be severely restricted, if retained at all."
Coffey's final dissenting opinion thus exhibited disagreement with
every preceding view in the case. It took basic issue with the "majority's" affording public duty protection to the county defendants for the
washed out road. Presumably, the dissent rejected an expansion of
protective police services to the actions of the county officers. Likewise,

201. Id. at 722, 515 S.E.2d at 380-81.
202. Id. at 721, 515 S.E.2d at 380.
203. Id. at 722, 515 S.E.2d at 381.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 723, 515 S.E.2d at 381 (Carley, J., dissenting).
206. Id. "I would affirm the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it finds the public
duty doctrine to be inapplicable to the facts of this case." Id. The dissent offered no
express rationale for its decision that the county officers should not enjoy the limitation of
the public duty doctrine in this factual setting.
207. Id. at 722, 515 S.E.2d at 381.

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. "The incorporation of the public duty doctrine into Georgia's tort jurisprudence
has resulted in a limitation on liability which is in addition to that provided by
constitutional governmental immunity." Id.

212. Id.
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the dissent found no acceptable solution in the special concurrence's
elaborate "restatement" of the public duty doctrine: neither its explicit
broadening of police services nor its addition of a major new exception.
Finally, the single-justice opinion disputed the other dissent's entire
concept of the public duty doctrine. Instead of limiting governmental
immunity, public duty operated in precisely the opposite direction-and
for that very reason deserved severe judicial restriction.
VII.
This saga of the public duty doctrine graphically illustrates two facets
from a 1994 study of Georgia local government law.21
First, local
government liability leads all litigated subjects in appearances before the
appellate courts.2 14 Second, those courts justifiably view local government cases as presenting issues of considerable complexity.2" 5
The public duty doctrine itself arises from tort law's traditional refusal
to impose a "duty of affirmative action," or an obligation of nonfeasance." 6 Thus, a local government ordinarily breaches no enforceable
negligence duty to an injured individual when it "merely" fails adequately to provide a protective public service.217 Unless the individual
enjoyed some special relationship to the government, there is no valid
negligence claim; and it matters not at all whether, if a negligence claim
21 8
existed, the government would possess immunity from it.
When (in 1993) the Georgia Supreme Court embraced the public duty
doctrine in City of Rome v. Jordan,"9 its near-unanimous opinion rang
most of the changes: the issue was one of duty, it preceded consideration
of immunity, it concerned municipal nonfeasance, and it rested upon two
(albeit contrasting) policies of legal parity. Special relationship, the
court made clear, constituted an exception to the doctrine-not the
220
doctrine itself.
The job of putting the principle into jurisprudential play fell immediately to the Georgia Court of Appeals. That court routinely applied the
doctrine in a number of cases over the next three years. Indeed, without
indicating cognizance of the fact, the court extended the principle beyond
the contexts of both nonfeasance and law enforcement. In those cases,

213. Sentell, Georgia Local Government Law, supra note 1.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 2 SANDRA STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35.06 (1998).
217. See supra note 19.
218. 2 SANDRA STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35.06 (1998).
219. 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
220. Id. at 28, 426 S.E.2d at 863.
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moreover, the court remained largely unreceptive to claimants' efforts at
invoking the special relationship exception.
In 1996 the supreme court returned to the evolutionary scene with its
decision in Department of Transportationv.Brown.2

There, the court

unanimously rejected the DOT's reliance on public duty.2 22 Minus any
effort at elaboration, the court limited the doctrine to the failure of police
protection against the "behavior of third parties." 223 Neither of the
court's proffered distinctions between City of Rome and Brown wore well
upon reflection, nor were the policy concerns of the former case expressly
demonstrated as unsuited to the circumstances of the latter case.
Less than one year later, in Hamilton v. Cannon224 (only its third
public duty decision), the supreme court abandoned all pretense of
unanimity.225 A four-justice majority opinion summarily and conclusively limited City of Rome to its facts; a suddenly enlightened threejustice dissent urged a broadening of both doctrine and exception, as well
as the doctrine's outright extension to governmental misfeasance.
Whatever the convoluted message of Hamilton, the court of appeals
labored to apply it in Coffey v. Brooks County.226

There, the court's

entire bench appeared to believe that the public duty doctrine should
apply. However, the judges also appeared to believe that Hamilton
precluded applicability. UnderHamilton,they reluctantly concluded, the
doctrine simply could not cover Coffey's local law enforcement officers
who failed to protect the public from hazardous road conditions resulting
from a rainstorm. 227 Expressing an unmistakable note of analytical
exasperation, the court of appeals openly challenged the supreme court
to revisit the embroglio.
Regrettably, the supreme court accepted the challenge. A contrived
controlling combination of two two-justice positions reversed the court
of appeals, declaring the pubic duty doctrine applicable to the case.22
Under that doctrine, county officials breached no enforceable negligence
duty in inspecting and failing to barricade the washed-out road.22 9
That conclusion, however, represented the single point in Coffey on
which more than two justices could agree.23 °

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).
218 Ga. App. 178, 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995).
267 Ga. 655, 482 S.E.2d 370 (1997).
267 Ga. at 8, 471 S.E.2d at 852.
267 Ga. 655, 482 S.E.2d 370 (1997).
231 Ga. App. 886, 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998).
Id. at 887-88, 500 S.E.2d at 345.
270 Ga. at 716, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
Id.
Id. at 716-17, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
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As of 1999, therefore, the various opinions in Rowe v. Coffey 2"' offer
a view (and more) for each taste. First, there is the view (two justices)
that City of Rome, Brown, and Hamilton can all be "read" in harmony;
that the reader will simply omit Brown's obsession with "third parties";
that the public duty doctrine is limited to "protective police services";
and that, although those services are not yet fully known, they do cover
the failure to protect against natural hazards. Second, there is the view
(two justices) that a mere rereading of the prior cases will not suffice-that the public duty doctrine must now be restated. The restatement offers both an explicitly crafted definition of police services (general
public safety protections) and a newly fashioned additional exception
(based on presence, knowledge, and resources). Under the restatement,
City of Rome and Brown can stand; Hamilton, however, is overruled
because it falls under the new exception (which operates to exclude the
case from the doctrine). Third, there is the view (two justices) that the
public duty doctrine imposes a new liability upon local governments, a
liability piercing the protections of governmental immunity. Coffey, as
opposed to both Brown and Hamilton, (a) furthers that liability
imposition, and (b) unwisely extends public duty to acts of misfeasance.
Fourth, there is the view (one justice) that the public duty doctrine plays
no part of governmental immunity, that it operates to restrict governmental liability, and that it should receive severe judicial limitation-a
limitation at odds with affording the doctrine's protection to the county
officials in Coffey.
VIII.
From 1993 to 1999, via a total of only four decisions, the Georgia
Supreme Court has analytically decimated the doctrine of public
duty-and vice versa. At the conclusion of this six-year evocative
evolution, the court stands captive to a bewildering labyrinth of doctrinal
expositions. No one of those elaborated syntheses garners the support
of the other, much less musters a majority of the court. What manner
of "doctrine" can so thoroughly paralyze a modern jurisdiction's highest
judicial tribunal?
Doubtlessly, the court fully appreciates the debilitating emanations
from its decisional default. Without question, its members will regroup
sufficiently to ensure that litigants at least understand why they fail or
prevail on this basic issue of local government law. This confluence of
clarification hopefully will soon ensue. It would facilitate fairness and
foster freedom-the freedom of a court held hostage to its own creation.

231.

270 Ga. 715, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999).

